ISG Research Seminars 2011/2012

Programme

Speaker: Tom Chothia (University of Birmingham)

Title: Using Information Theory and Statistics to Measure Information Leaks

Abstract: In this talk I will describe how information theory can be used to quantify information leaks from secure systems, and how these measures can be estimated from trial runs of a system. Information theory
provides meaningful definitions of leakage that can be applied in a wide range of situations, and using statistical estimation makes it possible to use these techniques to test implemented systems. As an example, I’ll discuss a time-based traceability attack against the RFID chip in e-passports.

This is joint work with Kostos Chatzikokolakis and Apratim Guha

Speaker: Michael Huth (Imperial College, London)

Title: TBA

Speaker: James Heather (University of Surrey)

Title: TBA

Speaker: Barbara Kordy (University of Luxembourg)

Title: TBA

Speaker: Jacob Schuldt (RCIS - AIST, Japan)

Title: TBA

Speaker: Peter Ryan (University of Luxembourg)

Title: TBA

Speaker: Claire Vishik (Intel)

Title: TBA

Speaker: Tibor Jager (KIT Karlsruhe)

Title: A Standard-Model Security Analysis of TLS-DHE
(joint work with Florian Kohlar, Sven Schäge, and Jörg Schwenk)

Abstract: TLS is the most important cryptographic protocol in use today. However, up to now there is no complete cryptographic security proof in the standard model, nor in any other model. We give the first such proof for the TLS ciphersuites based on ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange (TLS-DHE), which include the cipher suite TLS DHE DSS WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA mandatory in TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1. Due to subtle problems with the encryption of the final Finished messages of the TLS handshake, this proof cannot be formulated in the Bellare-Rogaway (BR) or any other indistinguishability-based model. Therefore we only prove the security of a truncated version of the TLS handshake (which has been the subject of all previous papers on TLS except [34]) completely in the standard BR model. We then define the notion of authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) as a model in which the combination of TLS handshake and TLS Record Layer can be proven secure.

Past seminars: programmes and slides

Time and place

Thursdays 11 am - 12 noon, Room 229 in McCrea Building
(Until September 2011, the standard time was 1PM.)

The directions can be found here, and here.

All welcome!

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