Arrival and check in

Registration

Bourne Lecture Theatre 1

ETISS Introduction

Boris Balacheff, HP Labs

Bourne Lecture Theatre 1

Trusted Computing Backgrounder

Andrew Martin, University of Oxford

Bourne Lecture Theatre 1

In this session we will set the scene for the main content of the week. The lecture will explore the idea of trust in computing, and the narrow technical definition used by the technologies of trusted infrastructure. We will describe the function of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in securing a trusted boot and execution environment, and other components such as trusted storage and trusted network connect. This session is intended as an introduction to these topics: those who have attended ETISS before, or already have a lot of background knowledge, can safely miss this talk (but only this one!).

Break

Lab 1a: Capture the Flag Introduction

Allan Tomlinson, ISG Royal Holloway

Bourne Annexe

The Capture the Flag lab will allow students to  explore some of the practical issues involved in securing a network. Students will work in small teams in this lab and each team will have a `target’ system that they have to defend, and an `attack’ machine which they will use to test the security of other teams’ systems. Throughout this exercise students will be encouraged to consider how the application of trusted computing techniques could help secure their network. Day 1 will provide some background to penetration testing and allow the students time to secure their targets.

Break

Lab 1b: Capture the Flag Team Set-up

Allan Tomlinson, ISG Royal Holloway

Bourne Annexe

Dinner - SCR

Arrival and check in

Registration

Arts Lecture Theatre 1

Invited Keynote: On Trusted Computing, Desktop Security, and Why This All Matters?

Joanna Rutkowska, Invisible Things Lab

Arts Lecture Theatre 1

Break

Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
Deep Dive

Graeme Proudler, HP Labs

Arts Lecture Theatre 1

This presentation is mostly intended for newcomers to TPMs. It describes the context for a TPM and the building blocks provided by a TPM. The context includes how a TPM fits into a platform, what it does, some of the design constants, and hints at those aspects that should be improved in future TPM designs. The `building blocks' include endorsement, attestation, the Protected Storage hierarchy, and some ancillary TPM functions.

Lunch - The Hub

Lab 2: Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

Martin Pirker & Ronald Tögl, Graz University of Technology

Bourne Annexe

The "TPM Lab" provides an introduction to the central component of Trusted Computing, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The lab explains TPM activation control, basic operations, and high-level programming of the the TPM via JSR321. The concept of chain-of-trust is explored in a practical sealing experiment.

Break

Lab 1c: Capture the Flag Team Technical Set-up and Launch

Allan Tomlinson, ISG Royal Holloway

Bourne Annexe

This session is devoted to testing the opposing teams’ systems

Dinner - SCR

Chain of Trust and DRTM

David Grawrock, Intel

Bourne Lecture Theatre 1

David will cover chains of trust. When dealing with those chains one needs to figure out where does the chain start, how does one extend the chain, and how does one tell others about the chain. The discussion will also focus on the two methods of starting a chain, static root of trust and dynamic root of trust and what platform functions must be present to make those roots a reality.

Break

Lunch - The Hub

Excursion to Bletchley Park

Meet outside the tennis courts for departure. Be prompt!

Dinner - SCR

Trusted Infrastructure and Trusted Computing Standards

Boris Balacheff, HP Labs

Bourne Lecture Theatre 1

Trusted Virtual Domains

Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Ruhr-University, Bochum

Bourne Lecture Theatre 1

A Trusted Virtual Domain (TVD) is a coalition of virtual machines that are distributed over multiple physical platforms and share a common security policy. It allows groups of related virtual machines running on separate physical machines to be connected together as though there were on their own separate network fabric and, at the same time, helps to enforce cross-group security requirements such as isolation, confidentiality, security, and information flow control. TVDs are very well suited basis technology for cloud computing applications and to be deployed in the context of large-scale IT systems such as Datacenters, eHealth and eGovernment, etc.

In this talk we present a security architecture for TVDs where we mainly focus on the incorporation of Trusted Computing functionality into the TVD framework. We describe the main components and protocols necessary to realize the TVD design on a cross-platform architecture.

Break

TURAYA.TrustedDesktop - A Practical Application of Trusted Virtual Domains

Christian Stüble, Sirrix AG Security Technologies

Bourne Lecture Theatre 1

The prevention of data leakage and alternation has always been a concern for single users, private companies as well as governmental bodies. This problem became more stressing with the incorporation of mobile storage devices such as USB-sticks in sensitive document workflows. Trusted Virtual Domain (TVD), a novel security model building on virtualization and isolation techniques, promises an efficient solution to the problem by leveraging information flow control concepts. In this talk, we describe a realization of this model based on the TURAYA.TrustedDesktop architecture, and we show how this technology can effectively ensure data protection against confidentiality and integrity breaches. The talk closes with a short product demo of TURAYA.TrustedDesktop illustrating the current state of the TVD realization based on Trusted Computing technology.

Lunch - The Hub

Lab 3: Chain of Trust and DRTM

Carlo Gebhardt, ISG Royal Holloway

Bourne Annexe

This lab provides a practical session to the Dynamic Root of Trust (DRTM) and the Flicker prototype in particular.
We will explore the technical building blocks of the DRTM, specifically on Intel platforms.

This lab will require some programming skills.

Break

RW1: Security Evaluation and Certification Workshop

Boris Balacheff, HP Labs & Paul Waller, CESG

Bourne Lecture Theatre 1

Birds of a Feather

Bourne Lecture Theatre 1

Drinks Reception

Crossland Suite, Founders Building

Gala Dinner

Crossland Suite, Founders Building

Systems Security Architectures

Loïc Duflot, ANSSI

Bourne Lecture Theatre 1

In this presentation, we will study some of the assumptions trusted computing is relying upon and try to determine to which extent they are accurate. Can hardware really be trusted? Is hardware that simple? Is there a limit to security policies that operating systems or "Trusted Computing Bases" can enforce? Can passwords guaranty strong authentication? These are some of the questions that will be discussed.

Return-oriented Programming: How to Perform Arbitrary Computation Without Code Injection

Lucas Davi, Ruhr-University, Bochum

Bourne Lecture Theatre 1

Runtime attacks on software aim at subverting the control-flow of an application by redirecting execution to injected malicious code. Trusted Computing technologies such as IBM's integrity measurement architecture (IMA) cannot prevent such attacks, because they mainly ensure the load-time integrity of applications. Many runtime attacks, however, are based on corrupting functions' return addresses so that the affected function does not return to its original caller, but to the adversary's injected code.

On the other hand, new attacks induce malicious behavior by only using existing code of linked libraries instead of injecting codes (particularly because the recently proposed memory protection mechanisms prevent the execution of injected code). These attacks are generally referred to as "return-oriented" attacks, since they return to code of already linked libraries. A particular powerful attack of this category are based on "return-oriented programming (ROP)". They combine various small instruction sequences of different functions to constitute arbitrary program behavior. The attack method has shown to be Turing-complete and has been deployed to a broad range of architectures: Intel x86, SPARC, Atmel AVR, ARM, etc. In this lecture we provide an overview on ROP for different hardware architectures and present recently available exploits which are built upon the principles of ROP. Finally, we will discuss possible countermeasures.

Break

Mobile Security Developments

Jan-Erik Ekberg, Nokia Research Centre

Bourne Lecture Theatre 1

The lecture will provide an overview of platform security mechanisms in mobile handsets. We will explore some of the available hardware mechanisms for providing the trust foundation for system security. Secure boot and operating system security concepts will be reviewed using Symbian, Maemo/Meego and Android security as use cases. We will also look at The Mobile Trusted Module (MTM) - a finalized specification by the Trusted Computing Group that extends the TPM for mobile use cases like secure boot. We conclude by presenting some novel developments in the domian of mobile security.

Lunch - The Hub

Lab 4: Mobile Practical

Kurt Dietrich, Graz University of Technology & Jan-Erik Ekberg, Nokia Research Centre

Bourne Annexe

This Lab deals with the foundations of Mobile Trusted Computing. We will explain the basic concepts of "SecureBoot", "Multiple-Stakeholder-Model" and "Reference-Integrity-Metric-Certificates" by means of practicle exams. Moreover, we will illustrate the differences between desktop TPMs and Mobile TPMs and which requirements are necessary on modern handsets in order to implement them in a secure way.

Break

RW2: Mobile Security Workshop

Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Ruhr-University, Bochum

Bourne Lecture Theatre 1

Lab 1d: Capture the Flag Results and Debrief

Allan Tomlinson, ISG Royal Holloway

Bourne Lecture Theatre 1

Students will give a  brief presentation on how they secured their system, and what vulnerabilities they found in others

Dinner and Pub Quiz

Crossland Suite, Founders Building

Modelling and Verifying Protocol Security

Ben Smyth, University of Birmingham

Arts Lecture Theatre 1

This talk will provide an introduction to the automatic protocol verifier ProVerif. The tool is based on more than a decade of theoretical research and is capable of proving reachability properties, correspondence assertions, and observational equivalence.
We will see how these capabilities are particularly useful to the computer security domain since they permit the analysis of secrecy and authentication properties. Moreover, emerging properties such as privacy, traceability and verifiability can also be considered.

Trusted Computing with Embedded Computer Platforms

Hans Brandl, Infineon Technologies AG

Arts Lecture Theatre 1

Trusted Computing (TC) is now an already established technology, which increases trust and security for computing platforms. Currently the TCG standard is primary targeted for PCs and also some first standardisation results exist for mobile phones. Using the TCG standard for the much broader spectrum of other embedded computing platforms has not yet started in a wide volume by public research or known implementations

On the other hand the TC- approach makes first time security technologies possible, where external attacks as well as internal malfunctions could be recognized and counter measurements started by the system. As embedded platforms and applications outnumber the current application platforms like PCs, specific considerations have to be taken to adapt TC technology to such platforms. There are special considerations which have to be taken into account like: Limited memory resources, specific requirements for operating systems, economical necessity of fully integrated solutions and support for a broad range of developers which are not TC experts.

There also some basic needs in addition to existing trusted hardware chips to build complete systems:

• Trusted Operating systems for embedded computing platforms
• Adapted and integrated implementations of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) esp. for embedded platforms.
• Support-, middleware and management SW for the control and handling of trusted embedded platforms

Break

Invited Keynote: Security Challenges for UK Government

Ian White, CESG

Arts Lecture Theatre 1

Lunch - Arts Lecture Theatre